We study truthful auctions for secondary spectrum usage in wireless networks. In this scenario, n communication requests need to be allocated to k available channels that are subject to interference and noise. We present the first truthful mechanisms for secondary spectrum auctions with symmetric or submodular valuations. Our approach to model interference uses an edge-weighted conflict graph, and our algorithms provide asymptotically almost optimal approximation bounds for conflict graphs with a small inductive independence number ρ n. This approach covers a large variety of interference models such as, for instance, the protocol model or the recently popular physical model of interference. For unweighted conflict graphs and symmetric valuations we use LP-rounding to obtain O(ρ)-approximate mechanisms; for weighted conflict graphs we get a factor of O(ρ · (log n + log k)). For submodular users we combine the convex rounding framework of Dughmi et al. [2011] with randomized metarounding to obtain O(ρ)-approximate mechanisms for matroid-rank-sum valuations; for weighted conflict graphs we can fully drop the dependence on k to get O(ρ · log n). We conclude with promising initial results for deterministically truthful mechanisms that allow approximation factors based on ρ. 
INTRODUCTION
The development of wireless networks crucially relies on successful management of the frequency spectrum to provide reliable network access. Nowadays, spectrum allocation is static -service providers (so-called primary users) can obtain nationwide licenses for channels in governmental spectrum auctions. This practice is inefficient and problematic: While primary users often use their spectrum bands only in selected local areas, new and innovative applications suffer in their development, because global licenses are difficult to obtain or generally unavailable. A major research effort is currently under way in computer science and engineering to overcome this artificial scarcity and let primary users open their bands in local areas for so-called secondary usage. Auctions are attractive to coordinate secondary spectrum usage, as they allow implementing social or monetary goals in a market with self-interested participants having private information. Interest in secondary spectrum auctions has increased significantly in recent years (see Berry et al. [2010] for a general introduction and , , Hoefer et al. [2014] , Zhou and Zheng [2009] , and Zhou et al. [2008] for more specific issues), but the algorithmic and strategic problems are still poorly understood.
In secondary spectrum markets, a natural regulatory goal is to maximize social welfare, that is, the total valuation or benefit of the channel allocation to the secondary users. As constraint for the allocation, the assigned channels must allow successful transmission in the presence of interference and noise. Positioning and interference situation is often known or can sometimes even be observed publicly, but valuations are private information of the users and have to be collected by the algorithm. In this process, secondary users have an obvious incentive to manipulate the algorithm by misreporting their valuation. In this article, we therefore strive to design truthful mechanisms that allocate channels and use payments to motivate users to reveal their values truthfully.
This scenario represents a novel and nontrivial extension of combinatorial auctions. In combinatorial auctions we have to allocate k indivisible items (channels) to n bidders (users). Each bidder v has a valuation b v (S) for any subset S of items. The goal is to maximize social welfare, that is, the sum of (reported) valuations for the assigned item sets. Secondary spectrum auctions extend this model by allowing to give a single item/channel to multiple users if the set of users is feasible in terms of interference. Interference can be modeled in various ways, and we follow the approach of Hoefer et al. [2014] , where users are vertices in a publicly known edge-weighted conflict graph. A set of users is feasible for a channel if they form an independent set in the graph, for a suitably defined notion of independent set. This approach covers virtually all existing interference models in the literature [Hoefer et al. 2014; Wan et al. 2009 ]. For instance, if users are communication requests in the physical model of interference, we can use edge weights corresponding to the affectance between requests, and feasibility due to bounded signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is then equivalent to having an independent set (as defined below, see also Hoefer et al. [2014] ).
Interestingly, conflict graphs resulting from popular interference models (e.g., protocol model [Wan 2009 ] or physical model [Halldórsson et al. 2013; Hoefer et al. 2014; Kesselheim 2011; Kesselheim and Vöcking 2010] ) have a small inductive independence number ρ (for a formal definition see Definition 2.3 in Section 2.1). The wide applicability of this nonstandard graph parameter for algorithm design is only recently starting to be explored [Akcoglu et al. 2002; Chen et al. 2010; Ye and Borodin 2012] . For our secondary spectrum auctions it allows to bypass well-known lower bounds of (n 1− ) for approximating independent set and derive significantly improved guarantees based on ρ [Hoefer et al. 2014] . However, even in ordinary combinatorial auctions with ρ = 1 any efficient algorithm can only achieve a factor of (min{n 1−ε , k 1/2−ε }) unless we make additional assumptions on the user valuations [Lehmann et al. 2002; Mirrokni et al. 2008 ].
Contribution
In this article, we design randomized auctions for spectrum markets, where secondary users strive to acquire one or more of a set of available channels. Making additional assumptions on the user valuations allows us to bypass the lower bound of min{n 1−ε , k 1/2−ε } and to significantly improve previous results. We examine the two prominent classes of symmetric and submodular valuations. Both classes occupy a central position in the auction literature and have very natural and intuitive interpretations in the context of secondary spectrum auctions. Symmetric valuations are the analog to multi-unit auctions, where each valuation only depends on the number of channels rather than the exact subset. This is a natural assumption in a secondary spectrum auction of equally sized channels which all offer very similar conditions. Submodularity is economically interpreted as diminishing marginal returns. This is a natural assumption in many cases. A common representative are coverage valuations, where users pick elements each covering a certain range, and the value is the total covered area. As an example imagine, for instance, secondary users as transmitters that strive to reach as many mobile stations as possible, where each of the latter operates on a fixed subset of channels.
For symmetric valuations (see Section 3) we use the intuition of multi-unit auctions and round a suitably defined linear program yielding only an assignment of numbers of channels. Using these numbers an independent set for each channel is then created by a greedy approach. This allows us to avoid dependence on k and obtain an approximation factor of O(ρ) for unweighted conflict graphs. Note that this is asymptotically almost optimal under standard complexity assumptions. Theorem 5 in Hoefer et al. [2014] shows that there is no ρ/2 O( √ log ρ) -approximation unless P = NP. Truthfulness is achieved via combination of our approach with the celebrated randomized metarounding framework by Lavi and Swamy [2011] . For edge-weighted conflict graphs, the construction step of independent sets is significantly more involved. The asymmetry of conflicts inherent in edge-weighted graphs requires the use of additional concurrent contention-resolution methods to partition the rounded set of requests into feasible independent sets. This approach allows us to obtain a factor of O(ρ · (log n + log k)). Our resulting mechanisms are randomized, run in polynomial time, and yield truthfulness in expectation.
For submodular valuations (see Section 4) we focus on matroid-rank-sum valuations, which encompass the most frequently studied submodular valuations. We design randomized mechanisms that fall into the class of maximum-in-distributional-range (MIDR) mechanisms (for an explanation see Section 2.2 or [Dobzinski and Dughmi 2013] ). In particular, our approach is along the lines of the convex rounding technique recently pioneered in Dughmi [2011] and and achieves an approximation factor of O(ρ) for unweighted conflict graphs. Again, this is asymptotically almost optimal under standard complexity assumptions. In contrast to the case of symmetric valuations, we can fully omit the dependence on k and show factors of O(ρ · log n) even for weighted conflict graphs.
Our rounding scheme is similar to the Poisson rounding scheme of . In the Poisson rounding scheme, the allocation for each item is determined independently at random by rounding it to one of the users. The item rounding is done such that the possible distributions are limited to a restricted range. In particular, it is done such that the expected sum of user valuations is a concave function in terms of the underlying parameters describing the distributions. By careful design, it is possible to optimize over this range using convex optimization algorithms in expected polynomial time. In this sense, Poisson rounding falls into the MIDR paradigm. Thus, the resulting mechanism can be made truthful in expectation using appropriate VCG payments. It can be shown to provide an approximation factor of 1 − 1/e.
The main difference and complication is again the need to round each channel to an independent set of users. To achieve this, we also round independently for each channel. Instead of rounding to a single user, we build the required support of independent sets using a randomized metarounding approach. Probably the most technical contribution is showing that this rounding scheme preserves the favorable conditioning properties, which allow us to apply convex optimization techniques to compute the underlying distribution with sufficient precision in expected polynomial time, even for weighted conflict graphs. Our resulting mechanisms are again randomized and provide truthfulness in expectation.
Finally, we also briefly discuss designing deterministic truthful mechanisms (see Section 5). We present a promising initial result, a monotone greedy O(ρ · log n)-algorithm for a single channel in unweighted conflict graphs. However, this area remains mostly as an interesting and important avenue for future work.
Related Work
Our article is connected to recent approaches for designing truthful mechanisms in secondary spectrum markets without [Zhou and Zheng 2009; Zhou et al. 2008] and with nontrivial worst-case approximation guarantees, for instance, for social welfare and fairness or revenue . However, all these works are restricted to a single channel and unweighted conflict graphs. In contrast, variants of combinatorial auctions have been studied where items are sold in integer amounts [Bartal et al. 2003 ] but without restrictions on the set of bidders that receive a copy. To this date the only general (analytical) treatment of approximation algorithms and truthful mechanisms for multi-channel secondary spectrum auctions is Hoefer et al. [2014] where truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for general user valuations are designed using the inductive independence number in edge-weighted conflict graphs. For unweighted conflict graphs the approximation guarantee is
The former result is asymptotically almost optimal in ρ if k = 1 [Trevisan 2001 ] and in k if ρ = 1. The latter lower bound is a well-known result in combinatorial auctions [Lehmann et al. 2002; Mirrokni et al. 2008] .
In ordinary combinatorial auctions, these strong lower bounds initiated the study of relevant subclasses of valuations, for an overview see, for instance, Blumrosen and Nisan [2007] . Symmetric valuations essentially pose a knapsack problem of assigning numbers of items to bidders, and a deterministic truthful greedy 2-approximation [Mu'alem and Nisan 2008] was the first benchmark solution. Since then there has been significant progress including, for instance, approximation schemes for single-minded bidders [Briest et al. 2011] , k-minded bidders [Dobzinski and Nisan 2010] , or monotone valuations [Dobzinski and Dughmi 2013; Vöcking 2012 ]. In contrast to these works, we must additionally decompose assigned numbers of channels into an independent set for each single channel. Here we rely on rounding linear programs to ensure that such a decomposition exists and can be found in polynomial time.
For submodular valuations, social welfare maximization without truthfulness is essentially solved. Optimal (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithms exist even for value oracle access [Vondrák 2008 ], where each valuation b v is an oracle that we can query to obtain b v (S) for a single set S in each operation. This factor cannot be improved assuming either polynomial communication [Mirrokni et al. 2008] in the value oracle model or polynomial-time complexity in general [Khot et al. 2008] . For the strategic setting and general submodular valuations, the best factor is O(log m), and this holds even for universal truthfulness [Krysta and Vöcking 2012] . recently proposed a convex rounding technique to build truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. Their approach yields an optimal (1 − 1/e)-approximation for the class of matroid-rank-sum valuations. Very recently, Dughmi and Vondrák [2011] showed that a similar result cannot be obtained for general submodular valuations in the value-oracle model. Designing (nontruthful) algorithms for independent set problems in conflict graphs has received significant attention recently, especially for graphs based on the physical model of interference with SINR constraints. Generally, attention has focused on the (unweighted) maximum independent set problem. That is, in our notation, there is only a single channel and each request has a value of 1 for being in the independent set. Still, there are different problem variants depending on assumptions on the transmission powers. For specific transmission power assignments, asymptotically optimal performance bound were obtained when requests are located in various classes of metric spaces [Fanghänel et al. 2013; Goussevskaia et al. 2009; Halldórsson and Mitra 2011] . For the problem where powers can be arbitrarily chosen, there is a constantfactor approximation algorithm [Kesselheim 2011 ].
The inductive independence number is a nonstandard graph parameter that is only recently starting to receive increased attention. Up to our knowledge the parameter has first been used by Akcoglu et al. [2002] , and since then has been rediscovered independently a number of times (see, e.g., [Wan 2009]) . Ye and Borodin [2012] recently conducted the first study addressing general issues that arise when using the measure for solving algorithmic problems in unweighted graphs. The eminent usefulness of the parameter for analyzing interference models and spectrum markets was highlighted in Hoefer et al. [2014] and Halldórsson et al. [2013] .
PRELIMINARIES

Channel Allocation in Spectrum Markets
In secondary spectrum markets there is a set [ k] of k available channels and a set V of n users or bidders.
Definition 2.1. We identify several classes of valuation functions depending on conditions they satisfy for 
Note that every MRS function is submodular. For submodular valuations considered in this article we also assume that they are monotone. In contrast, we do not require monotonicity for symmetric valuations.
To model interference we represent users as vertices in a complete edge-weighted and directed conflict graph G = (V, E, w). The weight w (u, v) of edge (u, v) represents the interference that user u creates for user v if both are assigned to the same channel. In unweighted conflict graphs all weights w(u, v) ∈ {0, 1}. Interference between users is identical on each channel.
Note that our definition of independent set for unweighted conflict graphs is the same as in the classical sense. For many standard interference models, we can define weighted conflict graphs such that independent sets are exactly the sets for which we can have successful simultaneous transmission in the interference model. For instance, the protocol model results in unweighted conflict graphs, or the physical model of interference yields weighted conflict graphs where independent sets are feasible with respect to the SINR; for details see Hoefer et al. [2014] .
The algorithmic challenge in secondary spectrum markets is the channel allocation problem. In an optimal solution S, each user v receives a subset of channels S v ⊆ [ k] such that each channel is given to an independent set in the conflict graph and the social welfare b(S) = v∈V b v (S v ) is maximized. In contrast to ordinary combinatorial auctions, an independent set can include more than one user. Our mechanisms cope with this issue using a structural parameter called inductive independence number.
Definition 2.3. The inductive independence number for an edge-weighted conflict graph G = (V, E, w) is the smallest number ρ such that there is an ordering π of the vertices satisfying the following condition: For all v ∈ V and all independent sets M ⊆ V, we have
Hence, ρ is the smallest number such that by picking the best ordering we can bound for any v ∈ V the incoming weight from any independent set among previous vertices to at most ρ. We assume that ρ and the ordering π of V are given. For many interference models and their resulting conflict graphs, we can find in polynomial time small upper bounds on ρ and a corresponding ordering witnessing ρ. For example, in the protocol model ρ = O(1) [Wan 2009 ] and in the physical model ρ = O(log n) [Kesselheim and Vöcking 2010] or ρ = O(1) [Kesselheim 2011 ], depending on power control assumptions. In both cases, π orders users with decreasing or increasing distance between sender and receiver.
Mechanism Design Basics
To avoid that user v will strategically misreport his valuation, we charge payments p v and make truthfulness a dominant strategy. For each user v ∈ V we ensure that his quasi-linear utility
, where S and S denote the solutions to the channel allocation problem when v reports the true b v and a some possibly other b v , respectively. This can be achieved using classic VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) payments if the allocation problem is always solved optimally.
In contrast, efficient truthful mechanisms cannot compute optimal solutions to intractable problems. For some problems, deterministic mechanisms can achieve only trivial approximation guarantees [Papadimitriou et al. 2008 ]. The situation is much better if we resort to randomized mechanisms, which define a distribution D over the set of solutions S for the channel allocation problem and output an allocation S ∈ S according to D. In this case, we aim for truthfulness in expectation, that is, for The algorithm receives all reported valuations b v and optimizes exactly over D to find D ∈ D with maximum expected social welfare. Due to exact optimization over D, the mechanism can use VCG payments to guarantee truthfulness in expectation. The obvious problem in MIDR is designing the distributional range D (1) large enough to contain a good approximation for every possible vector of user valuations, and (2) small enough to allow for exact optimization over D in polynomial time. Our mechanisms in Sections 3 and 4 will all be MIDR mechanisms. In Section 5 we also briefly treat designing greedy mechanisms that are truthful and deterministic.
SYMMETRIC VALUATIONS
In this section we consider spectrum auctions with symmetric valuations in which
We first design approximation algorithms and then turn them into truthful MIDR mechanisms following the framework by Lavi and Swamy [2011] .
Let us first concentrate on designing good approximation algorithms. Our approach is to round the following LP relaxation based on k · |V| variables x v,i ∈ {0, 1} indicating if v gets exactly i channels or not. The relaxation reads Max.
(1)
The first set of constraints involves a vertex ordering. It relies on the condition that the inductive independence number for this ordering is bounded. In addition, it aggregates over the number of channels and uses the condition that each vertex obtains only one subset of at most k channels. Suppose we take any feasible allocation and define variables x v,i = 1 iff user v gets i channels. Then, on each channel we have a feasible independent set, and each user gets at most one subset of at most k channels. Hence, the two conditions inherent in the constraints hold, and therefore they will be satisfied. Note that for this choice of x the objective function equals exactly the social welfare of the allocation. Consequently, the optimum value of this LP upper bounds the optimum value for any feasible allocation. However, observe that the LP relaxes the problem more severely than usual, as an integral solution to the LP might not correspond to a feasible allocation. In particular, the relaxation does not specify which user receives which channel, but this information is critical for interference and feasibility of the requests. We solve the LP relaxation optimally. The computed fractional solution is then decomposed into two solutions x (1) and x (2) , that are rounded separately. Based on such a solution, for each user v a preliminary number of channels d (l) v is determined at random. The probability Pr d
v,i . Having assigned these numbers of channels, we still have to derive a feasible allocation. In this allocation, each user v either gets d (l) v channels or none.
Unweighted Conflict Graphs
In the case of unweighted conflict graphs, we use a simple greedy approach to distribute available channels to users, see Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, we iterate through the vertices in order of π values. For each user v we pick the preliminary
Algorithm 1: LP-Rounding for Symmetric Valuations and Unweighted Conflict Graphs
1 Decompose an optimal solution x to LP (1) into two solutions x (1) and x (2) as follows: Set
v := 0. With probability
Return the better one of the solutions S (1) and S (2) number of channels d (l) v at random with probability proportional to the optimum LP. Then we try to find a feasible set of d (l) v channels for which no conflict exists with respect to previous assignments. We assign any such subset to v if it exists; otherwise v gets no channels.
Iterating through the users in order of π allows to use the LP constraints and feasibility of the fractional optimum (which is basis for rounding) to characterize the probability that v gets d (l) v channels. This allows to bound the value of the resulting solution. In particular, the expected social welfare of the output will decrease only by a factor of O(ρ) under the fractional optimum, which is asymptotically optimal. The crucial insight in the proof is that for each user v at the time of allocation with probability at least 1 /2 more than d (l) v channels are available. More formally, solutions S (1) , S (2) separate the problem into two subproblems, in which the maximum or minimum nonzero number of channels allocated to a single player is k/2, respectively. We analyze both of these cases separately in the key proposition. PROPOSITION 3.2. For l ∈ {1, 2} and the expected social welfare of S (l) we have
v,i be a 0/1 random variable indicating if in the rounding stage d (l) v is set to i. The algorithm sets Pr X (l)
v,i = 1 ; that is, the probability that a user v does not receive i channels although d (l) v was set to i. 
By linearity of expectation and the fact that we have an LP solution this yields
So, we get by Markov's inequality
In total this yields
which proves the proposition for Case 1.
Using linearity of expectation and the definition of ρ this yields
Markov's inequality then implies that the probability that all of the u
8ρ , which proves the proposition for Case 2. 
Algorithm 2: LP-Rounding for Symmetric Valuations and Weighted Conflict Graphs
Run Algorithm ALLOCATE(l) on d (l) , let S (l) be the result.
7 Return the better one of the solutions S (1) and S (2) .
PROOF. (of Theorem 3.1) We note that by splitting the solution into two parts and returning the better output, we lose only a factor of 2 in the approximation guarantee. For the expected social welfare it holds max l∈{1,2} v∈V
With the previous proposition the proof follows.
Edge-Weighted Conflict Graphs
Allocating the channels is much more involved in the case of edge-weighted conflict graphs due to the asymmetry of interference constraints. In the unweighted case the simple greedy allocation only has to make sure there are no edges to vertices on the same channel. This is unsuitable now since adding a user might violate constraints at previously added users; even though constraints are satisfied for the currently added user.
Having obtained the d
v values in the described way, we first consider only the incoming weight from users of smaller index like in the unweighted case. If the incoming weight from previous users is too high, that is, if
we remove all channels from the user and set d (l) v := 0. However, unlike in the unweighted case, this does not yet guarantee the existence of an allocation. The crucial difference occurs in the last step, where the allocation is derived. This step is performed differently for the two solutions of the decomposition. For the case in which each user was assigned at most k/8 channels, the allocation is made in a randomized fashion in Algorithm ALLOCATE(1). For the other case, the allocation is made deterministically in Algorithm ALLOCATE(2). Unlike in the unweighted case, in both cases the resulting allocation will not include all users at a time but only allocate channels to a subset of the originally chosen users. In order to show the bound, we will show that both LP solutions are rounded to feasible allocations that are in expectation at most a O(ρ · (log n + log k)) factor worse than the respective LP solution.
Before running the subroutine ALLOCATE(l), the algorithm determines for each user v the number d (l) v of channels that is user is potentially allocated. As a first step, we show that a hypothetical allocation giving each user v all d (l) v channels simultaneously, would in expectation be at most a 1/128ρ factor worse than the fractional solution.
PROPOSITION 3.4. For l ∈ {1, 2} and the expected social welfare of d (l) we have
v,i be a 0/1 random variable indicating if in the rounding stage d (l) v is set to i. We know that Pr X (l)
v,i be the respective 0/1 random variable at the time when the allocation algorithm is started.
We have to bound Pr Y
v,i = 1 . This is the probability that the weight bound in line 5 is exceeded. By Markov's inequality, we get
Applying linearity of expectation and the fact we have an LP solution this is
In total, we obtain
Up to this point, we have found preliminary selections of numbers of channels such that u∈V,π(u)<π(v) 
. While this ensures a bound on the incoming weight from users of smaller index in π , the one from users of larger index is in principle still unbounded. In the two following subsections, we consider the two allocation algorithms and show that in either case a feasible allocation of social welfare at least ( v∈V b v (d (l) v )/(log n + log k)) is computed. In both cases, it will be necessary to resolve conflicts coming from users of larger index. Therefore, the overall structure of both algorithms is to iterate over users in decreasing order of π values. V and u∈V,π(u)<π(v) 
The idea is that a number of allocations are computed having the property that each user is considered in exactly one of these allocations. Each allocation is computed by first picking a subset H t of all users by going though the remaining users in decreasing order of π . If a user is selected, we perform k randomized contention resolution steps. We iterate over the k channels, and for each channel we let each user v independently perform a random experiment. With probability 8d v /k it receives this channel tentatively. If the user received d v channels it keeps the respective channels in this allocation and is dropped from consideration. All other users are allocated in later rounds. The main argument to show that this yields feasibility and provides the desired bound on the approximation Algorithm ALLOCATE(1): Channel allocation for users that require at most k/8 channels. Add u to H t and for each j ∈[ k] set X v,j independently to 1 with probability 8d v /k.
set S t v to an arbitrary subset of d v channels j with Y v,j = 1.
11
Set V t+1 := {v ∈ V t | S t v = ∅}, H t+1 := ∅, and t := t + 1.
12 Return the best one of the allocations S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , . . . factor relies on a suitable tracking of the successes during the contention resolution process.
LEMMA 3.5. The allocation computed by Algorithm ALLOCATE(1) has social welfare at least ( v∈V b v (d v )/(log n + log k)) with high probability, that is, with probability at least 1 − (nk) −c for any constant c > 1.
PROOF. In order to show this bound, it suffices to prove that
Using Markov's inequality this implies that for each constant c > 1 the probability that a set V t with t ≥ (c + 1) log(nk)/ log(4/3) is not empty is at most
Thus with high probability at most O(log( v∈V d v )) = O(log n + log k) allocations are computed. We prove the bound in two steps. First, we show that the sum of demands in the set H t is at least half of the total demands in V t . Afterwards, we observe that for a user in H t , the probability to be included is at least 1 2 . CLAIM 3.6.
PROOF. Each user u ∈ V t \ H t was excluded from H t because we have
Taking the sum, weighted by the respective d u value, we get
On the other hand, we have
Assembling the two bounds yields the claim.
CLAIM 3.7. The probability for each user v ∈ H t to be included in the allocation is at least
Let us first consider a single channel j. In order to have Y v,j = 1, two independent events have to occur: First, we have to have X v,j = 1 and second u =v (w(u, v)+w(v, u) )· X u,j < 1. The probability for the first one is defined in the algorithm, the second one can be bounded by Markov's inequality to get
Now, let us partition the set of all k channels into 2d v blocks of length k 2d v each, with some left over. Let us first focus on a single block B. As we in the current case
. Since furthermore the random experiments are independent, for such a block B the probability of j∈B Y v,j = 0 is at most
For each of the 2d v blocks, the probability of v getting no channel in this block is at most Combining these two insights, we get the desired bound which proves the lemma for the small sets and ALLOCATE(1).
ALLOCATE(2):
Allocation algorithm for "large" sets. The allocation for the case that d v ≥ k/8 or d v = 0 for all v ∈ V is performed by Algorithm ALLOCATE(2). Here, we iterate starting with t = 1. Again, a subset H t of all users is selected by going though the remaining users in decreasing order of π . If for a user v we have v∈H t d v ·(w(u, v)+ w (v, u) ) < k/32, it is added to H t . However, in this case the allocation is immediately carried out: Each user that is added to H t is allocated an arbitrary set of d v channels, Algorithm ALLOCATE(2): Channel allocation for users that require at least k/8 channels. Set V t+1 := {v ∈ V t | S t v = ∅}, H t+1 := ∅, and t := t + 1.
8 Return the best one of the allocations S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , . . .
for instance, the first ones. This iteration is repeated with the remaining users that did not get allocated anything until every user v ∈ V has been allocated d v channels in one iteration t. Finally, the algorithm picks the best of the allocations computed in any single iteration.
PROPOSITION 3.8. Algorithm ALLOCATE(2) computes at most O(log n + log k) allocations and all of them are feasible.
PROOF. Using exactly the same arguments as in Claim 3.6 above, we observe
which shows that at most O(log n + log k) allocations are computed.
The allocations are feasible since the sum of incoming weights on any channel is bounded by
In combination, this implies the following result about the approximation bound.
LEMMA 3.9. For l ∈ {1, 2}, ALLOCATE(l) returns a feasible allocation of social
With Proposition 3.4 this proves Theorem 3.3.
Mechanism Design
To turn our approximation algorithms into truthful mechanisms, we follow the idea by Lavi and Swamy [2011] using the randomized metarounding technique [Carr and Vempala 2002 ] to obtain a MIDR mechanism. Our approach is similar to the one for general secondary spectrum auctions [Hoefer et al. 2014] . We can apply this framework directly to turn our algorithms into truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. Below we mention a couple of potential issues in the application and why they represent no obstacle. For details on the framework and its properties we refer the reader to Lavi and Swamy [2011] and Hoefer et al. [2014] .
THEOREM 3.10. There is a truthful mechanism for symmetric valuations that runs in polynomial time and returns a feasible allocation representing O(ρ)-approximation for unweighted and a O(ρ · (log n + log k))-approximation for edge-weighted conflict graphs.
To observe that the technique can be applied, we note that (a) we can relax the underlying optimization problem to a packing linear program (1) and (b) our approximation algorithms verify a bounded integrality gap (i.e., the cost of the returned intergral solutions is guaranteed to be a bounded factor from the optimal fractional solution of the packing LP (1)). The metarounding framework takes the optimum of the LP, scales it down by the integrality gap and then uses the solutions returned by repeated application of the approximation algorithms to decompose the scaled LP-optimum into a distribution over feasible solutions. Truthfulness is then obtained using scaled VCG payments.
One issue is that our LP allows integral solutions that are infeasible for our problem. We must ensure that these solutions do not appear in the support of the distribution computed by the framework. Note that the approximation algorithms provide only feasible solutions, whose cost is bounded with respect to the fractional optimum of the LP. The support of the distribution computed by the framework results from applying the approximation algorithms. Therefore, it contains only feasible solutions for our problem.
Another issue is that the framework needs deterministic algorithms, as they are used as separation oracles within the ellipsoid method. To address this point, we note that the randomization in Algorithms 1 and 2 only depends on pairwise independence. Algorithms ALLOCATE(1) and ALLOCATE(2) can be made deterministic by using a combination of pairwise-independence and conditional-expectation techniques. Under these conditions, the algorithms can be used within the framework to find the desired decomposition in deterministic polynomial time.
Finally, a frequently encountered drawback is that assumptions on the valuation functions like symmetry or submodularity cannot be made, and algorithms for such special classes of valuations might not be applicable within the framework. However, in our case the symmetry assumption is encoded directly into LP (1) by setting up variables for each number instead of each set of channels. This property can be adopted for the whole technique (cf the multi-unit auction example of Lavi and Swamy [2011] ), and hence the approach is feasible.
MATROID-RANK-SUM VALUATIONS
In this section, we treat the class of so-called matroid rank sum (MRS) valuations, in which b v for each bidder is a weighted sum of matroid rank functions. This covers all frequently considered submodular valuation functions such as, for instance, coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and any convex combinations of these. For a definition of MRS functions recall Definition 2.1.
For ordinary combinatorial auctions, present an MIDR mechanism. The range is given by all solutions x to a linear relaxation of the item-allocation problem. Rounding is done via a nonstandard randomized rounding scheme called Poisson rounding in . In Poisson rounding, the allocation for each item is determined independently at random by rounding it to one of the users. When x i,j is the fractional allocation of item j to bidder i, then j is fully given to i with probability 1 − e −x i,j . With the remaining probability no bidder receives j. Finding the optimal distribution implies finding the fractional allocation x that will achieve best social welfare in expectation in the rounding stage. The Poisson scheme is a convex Remove each v ∈ V from solution with a further probability of p v,j = 1−e
x v,j α rounding scheme, for which finding the best fractional allocation becomes a convex program with objective function being expected social welfare. This way, it is possible to use convex optimization techniques and combine them with VCG payments to obtain a truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
Unfortunately, the Poisson rounding scheme is tailored to fit to ordinary combinatorial auctions. The rounding is performed item-wise. Unlike items, the channels in our case can be given to multiple users, and it takes significantly more effort to build a convex rounding scheme. In the following we present our approach for this case. We follow the conventions in , in particular, with respect to representation of MRS valuations using lottery-value oracles. We will show the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.1. There is a truthful mechanism for MRS valuations that runs in expected polynomial time and returns a feasible allocation representing a O(ρ)-approximation for unweighted and a O(ρ · log n)-approximation for edge-weighted conflict graphs.
Defining the Range
We define the distributional range D in this section and discuss why it is sufficiently large to get good approximations. Our starting point are all fractional solutions x fulfilling the following linear constraints:
For each channel we pick a feasible independent set separately in our rounding scheme Algorithm 3. For each channel j the corresponding fractional solution x ·,j is decomposed into polynomially many independent sets using parameter α discussed below. The algorithm selects one of these at random. Afterwards, each user v is removed from the solution with probability p v,j in an independent random draw, rendering the total probability for v to receive channel j to be exactly 1 − e −x v,j /2α . Note that p v,j must be a valid probability with p v,j ∈[ 0, 1]. Here we observe that since numerator and denominator are both positive, p v,j also is. Furthermore,
2α , for any α ≥ 1. Consequently, the range D is given by all probability distributions resulting from our rounding scheme applied to fractional solutions of (2a) and (2b).
The decomposition can be computed in polynomial time using randomized metarounding [Carr and Vempala 2002; Lavi and Swamy 2011] in combination with an appropriate rounding scheme. However, we have to specify the parameter α, which ensures that the decomposition of x ·,j exists. We interpret x ·,j as solution to a linear program to maximize v∈V a v · x v,j subject to the constraints (2a) and (2b) for channel j. This is essentially a linear relaxation for a single channel allocation problem with some valuations a v . We denote by α the integrality gap of this program with respect to feasible independent sets (Note that the constraints (2a) allow integer solutions x that represent infeasible independent sets). For this program we can verify an integrality gap of α = O(ρ ·log n) for feasible independent sets using, for instance, the LP-rounding algorithm for edge-weighted conflict graphs from Hoefer et al. [2014] . For unweighted conflict graphs, the simpler LP-rounding algorithm from Hoefer et al. [2014] yields α = O(ρ). Here, the simple greedy algorithm of Akcoglu et al. [2002] (for details see Section 5 below) can even be shown to yield α = ρ.
In either case, this allows to construct a decomposition LP and its dual, which can be solved in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method, where the algorithm acts as separation oracle (for details on this method see Carr and Vempala [2002] and Lavi and Swamy [2011] ). Note that α can merely be seen as a parameter that serves to scale a fractional solution x into a region where a decomposition into (feasible) integral solutions exists, independent of any objective function. The reason we interpret it as integrality gap of an optimization problem is that the dual of the decomposition LP allows an approximation algorithm verifying the gap to be used to separate the dual and derive the required decomposition in polynomial time. The reason we do not simply radically overestimate α is that it does play a central role when we discuss the approximation factor of our rounding scheme.
For a given distribution, the expected social welfare of the returned allocation is exactly
For the case of MRS functions, this function is concave, as we will observe in more detail below. Therefore, the best distribution in the range can be arbitrarily approximated by solving a convex program, maximizing the concave objective (3) subject to linear constraints (2a) and (2b). As previously mentioned, the size of the range affects approximation factor and tractability. Concerning the approximation factor, we can show that the social welfare of the optimal allocation is at most an O(α)-factor above the expected social welfare of the best distribution in the range.
LEMMA 4.2. The optimal distribution within the range is O(α)-approximate in expectation when valuations are submodular. Hence, in expectation, the solution of our rounding scheme is a O(ρ)-approximation for unweighted and a O(ρ · log n)-approximation for edge-weighted conflict graphs.
PROOF. The optimal allocation S * corresponds to a feasible solution x * of the convex program. However, x * is not always rounded to S * but also to worse allocations. We bound the expected welfare of the received allocation in terms of that of S * . This then yields the upper bound on the approximation ratio. The probability of each user v of being allocated channel j in rounding is exactly 1 − e v) ) and use Proposition C.4 in . This yields an expected social welfare of the rounded allocation of at least (1 − e −1/(2α) ) · b(S * ) ≥ 1 − e −1 · (2α) −1 · b(S * ) due to concavity. Thus, the result of rounding the best distribution is at most a factor of O(α) worse. 
Sampling the MIDR Distribution
The expected social welfare when rounding a fractional solution x is given by (3). Fortunately, this function is concave in terms of x meaning an optimal fractional solution can be approximated arbitrarily well in polynomial time. However, to make the mechanism truthful in expectation, we are, in principle, required to solve the given convex program exactly. Since this is not possible, Algorithm 6 devises a way to simulate an exact solution in expected polynomial time. It returns an allocation in which each bidder has exactly the same probability as in Algorithm 3 to get a channel. It requires us to compute δ-estimates -a solution x of the convex program such that
To simplify the presentation, we assume that this can be computed in time poly(n, k, log(1/δ)). Details on this issue will be presented in the next Section 4.3. PROOF. We distinguish between the two cases r = 1 and r ≥ 2. In the case of r = 1, y r fulfills equations (2a) and (2b). Here we can apply the decomposition as described above. Using the algorithms from [Hoefer et al. 2014] PROOF. Let r be defined as in the algorithm. Let us first consider the conditional probability of getting the channel given that r = t for some t.
We get
where the last step is due to the fact that y t v converges to x * v,j as t → ∞. PROPOSITION 4.6. Assuming that the δ-estimates can be computed in time poly(n, k, log(1/δ)), the expected running time of Algorithm 6 is polynomial in n and k.
PROOF. Let us first consider the running time for the case that r = t for some fixed t. If this case the δ-estimates in lines 5-7 can be computed in time t i=1 poly(n, k, log(2 i+1 n)) = poly(n, k, t). The remaining computations take time poly(n, k). As a consequence, the expected running time of the algorithm is ∞ t=1 Pr [r = t] · poly(n, k, t) = ∞ t=1 2 −t · poly(n, k, t) = poly(n, k), where the last step is due to a geometric series.
Computing δ-Estimates
Algorithm 6 only runs in expected polynomial time when assuming that a δ-estimate of the convex program can be computed in time poly(n, k, log(1/δ)). The reasoning why we assume this is essentially the same as in . However, for the sake of completeness, we present the most important steps in this section. 
is concave for all v. By construction the probability for each user to be allocated channel j is exactly 1 − e −x v,j /(2α) . Therefore each E b v (S v ) can be written as
We only have to prove that this function is concave over (0, 1) k . show that the function G :
)) this also yields concavity since for any ξ ∈[ 0, 1]
This immediately yields the following claim when taking into consideration that the constraints are linear. . This solution can be computed in time poly(n, k, log(1/δ)).
Finally, let us observe how we can guarantee good conditioning. In general, the bound on the second derivative does not necessarily have to hold. Therefore, the algorithm is modified as given in Algorithm 5.
After having run Algorithm 6, the resulting allocation is discarded with probability μ = 2 −nk . Instead a trivial allocation is returned, in which either only a single user gets allocated all channels or even no channels are allocated at all, as determined by another random experiment. However, since this action is only taken with probability 1 − μ = 1 − o(1), the approximation factor is not affected.
On the contrary, we can show that the expected social welfare changes, now having a curvature of at least λ. This is the missing piece to build the δ-estimates necessary to run the algorithm.
In order to determine the precise expected social welfare of the modified algorithm, we have to first quantify the probability that the initially computed solution is discarded. This is done with probability β, which depends on the previous outcome. For the expectation, we know
Therefore the expected social welfare is
Since both parts of the outer sum are nonnegative, it suffices to bound the curvature of the second one. The curvature of
is at least (e(2α) 2 ) −1 . Therefore, the curvature of the second part is at least
As a consequence, the modified algorithm can be run with δ-approximates as described above with a resulting running time that is poly(n, k) in expectation.
DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
While the mechanisms presented in previous sections obtain nearly the best possible guarantees on social welfare, they have some drawbacks for application in practice. A serious problem are running times -for MRS valuations our mechanism obtains polynomial running time only in expectation. For symmetric valuations, we obtain polynomial worst-case running times, but the convex optimization techniques needed to apply randomized meta-rounding often have prohibitive running times for large practical problem instances. Thus, let us briefly discuss designing fast and simple mechanisms. How can we design a good and simple deterministic mechanism to incentivize truth-telling among bidders?
To our knowledge, there are only two algorithmic approaches to the channel assignment problem that yield approximation guarantees in the order of O(ρ). One approach is rounding of suitably relaxed packing LPs, which turned out to be very successful in this and our previous work [Hoefer et al. 2014] . While pairwise independence can be used to make these algorithms deterministic, they require randomization to guarantee truthfulness and fail for deterministic truthfulness. The other approach was proposed for the simplest case of a single channel and unweighted conflict graphs, that is, the maximum weighted independent set problem. It is a simple greedy algorithm due to Akcoglu et al. [2002] , which first considers vertices one by one in reverse of the ordering of π (Figure 1 ). If vertex v is under consideration, its current value is subtracted from the value of each backward neighbor. If the value of a vertex drops to 0 or below before it is under consideration in the ordering, this vertex is removed. Finally, the algorithm makes a second pass over the surviving vertices, this time in forward ordering of π , and greedily adds each vertex to the independent set if possible. It can be shown using a local ratio argument that it provides a ρ-approximation [Ye and Borodin 2012] .
It is tempting to believe that this algorithm is monotone and delivers a deterministically truthful mechanism. Unfortunately, there exist simple examples where this is not the case. The problem is that the algorithm makes a second pass over the vertices which introduces nontrivial dependencies among bids and acceptance decisions. Nevertheless, we show how to turn it into a monotone algorithm by spending a log n factor in the approximation guarantee. This is a promising first step towards designing simple truthful deterministic mechanisms with nontrivial approximation guarantees. In contrast to algorithms using the time-intensive solution of convex optimization problems, such quick and simple greedy rules are much more suitable for application in practice. Providing good and simple mechanisms is a major open direction for future work.
THEOREM 5.1. Algorithm 6 is deterministic and monotone. The computed solution is a O(ρ · log n)-approximation for the maximum weight independent set problem.
PROOF. We first prove that the algorithm is monotone. We show that if v ∈ S and lies a value b v < b v , then v will never be able to become part of S. Suppose v is currently first considered in iteration i. Submitting a smaller bid causes v to be considered at a later point j > i. In the sets V i , . . . , V j−1 player v is replaced by a different player, sets V 1 , . . . , V i−1 and V j , . . . , V n remain as before, and so do S 1 , . . . , S i−1 and S j , . . . , S n . If one of these sets was chosen as the best set before, then v will again not be part of S if he lies. The only sets that can be different now are S i , . . . , S j−1 , in which v cannot be present. If previously set S k with k ∈ {i, . . . , j − 1} was chosen as the best set, it did not include v. Thus, in the run v was blocked by some other vertex. Removing v does not change the execution of the algorithm, thus the same set will be computed again -however, due to the change in the ordering it will now appear as S k−1 . The only sets S k that can change are the ones with k ∈ {i, . . . , j − 1} where v was included before. However, if a new optimal set appears here, it does not include v as well. In conclusion, if v ∈ S, he cannot become included into S by reducing his bid.
To bound the approximation factor, we use an argument similar to Halldórsson [2000] . Let us consider the problem on the subset V i and assume all vertices have value b i . For this problem, our algorithm is equivalent to the greedy ρ-approximation algorithm for unweighted vertices. Hence, for this subproblem we obtain a ρ-approximation. With S i being the optimum for this subproblem, then we have This represents a promising first step towards designing simple truthful deterministic mechanisms with nontrivial approximation guarantees. In contrast to algorithms using the time-intensive solution of convex optimization problems, such quick and simple greedy rules are much more suitable for application in practice. In addition, the concept of truthfulness in expectation used in the previous sections has drawbacks, for instance, it is not enough to motivate risk-aware bidders to reveal their valuations truthfully. Providing good and simple mechanisms for stronger notions of truthfulness is a challenging and arguably the most interesting avenue for future work. We recently obtained some interesting results in this direction for single-parameter instances and universal truthfulness [Hoefer and Kesselheim 2013] .
Further interesting open problems include improving the approximation ratios given in this article. For example, it is unknown if the logarithmic terms in n and k for weighted conflict graphs are required. In addition, there might be improved approximation bounds for conflict graphs resulting from specific interference models.
